Feel free to jump to the heading "Safety Net #2" below, as everything stated until then is a repeat of what was written on the first article in this series.
This is a 14-part series. I hope you will read the series at your own pace, continuing to come back to this series until you’ve completed it. When reading through this 14 part series, remember that each piece fits within the collective contributing to the bigger picture, and that each unique piece is NOT actually separate from the whole.
When it comes to the various products that are available for purchase, there are many safety nets that are established to protect consumers from dangerous products. Those safety nets ensure that products are designed, manufactured, and distributed in such a way that potential harms are minimized, and any harms are more easily and quickly identified once that product is in distribution. Unfortunately, there are shortcomings in many of these consumer safety nets, or industry has found a way to bypass some of those protective measures. As a result, unsafe products continue to be made and distributed widely. What’s more unique to vaccines though, is that every single one of the multiple safety nets that were established to protect people and ensure product safety, all those protective measures have actually been neutralized by the pharmaceutical industry. This neutralization has happened either by direct financial funding from pharma, or indirectly through Governmental conflicts of interest that have influenced internal policy, bureaucracy, and legislation. But before explaining how the consumer protective safety nets have been neutralized when it comes to vaccines, I’ll first list what those protective measures were, or should be. (Bolding in the list below denotes which topic point will be discussed in this article).
The consumer safety nets for vaccine products are:
Government and our political leaders who represent the people
Federal agencies that oversee vaccine regulation, research, safety, and distribution: These agencies include: Health and Human Services (HHS), The Food and Drug Administration (FDA), The Centers for Disease Control (CDC), The Institute of Medicine (IOM). Yes, these agencies are all based in the United States, however their policies are often adopted on a global scale.
Scientific research and medical journals
Our doctors and the institutions where they are educated and employed
Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS)
The legal system
Safety Net #2: The Federal Agencies
This article discusses the role the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) plays in protecting the public, and how this agency have been compromised by pharmaceutical financial influence. After discussing the FDA, a brief explanation of related Health Canada actions will also be provided.
The FDA is a Department within HHS. In Safety & Efficacy - 3, I detailed the June 1, 1984 HHS meeting, which discussed proposed changes to FDA regulations. In this meeting Government officials instructed then that the amendments were needed immediately, because ”any possible doubts, whether or not well founded, about the safety of the vaccine cannot be allowed to exist in view of the need to assure that the vaccine will continue to be used to the maximum extent consistent with the nation’s public health objectives."
In Safety & Efficacy - 18, I explained that that same sentiment, expressing the need to use propaganda and censorship, was stated again by the HHS 26 years later in 2010, by the then Secretary of HHS, Kathleen Sebelius. Her statement claimed that all scientific evidence opposes any vaccine crirtical view. She said,
There are groups out there that insist that vaccines are responsible for a variety of problems despite all scientific evidence to the contrary. We [HHS] have reached out to media outlets, to try and get them to not give the views of THESE PEOPLE equal weight in their reporting to what SCIENCE has shown and continues to show, about the safety of vaccines.
At its core, HHS' current position, that both media censorship and propaganda messaging be implemented to ensure vaccination coverage remains high, this position is rooted from ongoing pharmaceutical industry influence. The powerful and ongoing pressure that industry put on Government (likely from the very start when Government began regulating drugs), did slowly alter the very structural make-up of drug regulation and national health policy. Public health's purpose today, is not to create health, but rather, to manage disease. By default, the pharmaceutical industry has an important role in managing disease, the same cannot be said regarding their role in generating health.
David Graham, the FDA whistleblower, explained that the FDA structural make-up is biased favouring industry interests. He stated (emphasis mine):
As currently configured, the FDA is not able to adequately protect the American public. It's more interested in protecting the interests of industry. It views industry as its client, and the client is someone whose interest you represent. Unfortunately, that is the way the FDA is currently structured. Within the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research about 80 percent of the resources are geared towards the approval of new drugs and 20 percent is for everything else. Drug safety is about five percent. The "gorilla in the living room" is new drugs and approval. Congress has not only created that structure, they have also worsened that structure through the PDUFA, the Prescription Drug User Fee Act, by which drug companies pay money to the FDA so they will review and approve its drug.
...The Prescription Drug User Fee Act came into play in 1992. It was passed by Congress as a way of providing the FDA with more funds so that it could hire more physicians and other scientists to review drug applications. For industry, every day a drug is held up from being marketed, represents a loss of one to two million dollars of profit. The incentive is to review and approve the drugs as quickly as possible, and not stand in the way of profit-making. The FDA cooperates with that mandate.
Ten years after this interview, in 2015, a New York Times article explained that then FDA Commissioner, Dr. Robert Califf, inferred during a lecture that he gave that regulation actually hinders innovation. And, in a 2017 Los Angelos Times article, it explains how current FDA Commissioner, Dr. Scott Gottlieb wants to speed up the FDA drug approval process.
So presently, flawed FDA regulations helped produce the Vioxx catastrophe, and those deficient regulations have not been changed to prevent future catastrophes. Furthermore, in the opinion of two FDA commissioners (who have recently led or are now leading this agency), the flawed regulations are now viewed as too time consuming and as a barrier to innovation. Based on that, it's reasonable to assume that any changes made within the FDA, under the leadership of these men, have likely also been in the drug industry's favour.
In addition to FDA's structural practices that prioritize industry interest ahead of public interests, there is an additional layer of influence, where industry money flows to FDA appointed advisors. A letter that was recently submitted directly to the Secretary of HHS. And this letter identified the conflicts of interests held by FDA appointed advisors. The letter was prepared by the non-profit organization ICAN, and it explains:
HHS Licenses & Recommends Vaccines. With regard to the FDA’s Vaccines and Related Biological Products Advisory Committee (VRBPAC), which effectively decides whether to license a vaccine, in 2000 the U.S. House Committee on Government Reform (the Committee) “determined that conflict of interest rules employed by the FDA and the CDC have been weak, enforcement has been lax, and committee members with substantial ties to pharmaceutical companies have been given waivers to participate in committee proceedings.” The Committee concluded of the VRBPAC: “The overwhelming majority of members, both voting members and consultants, have substantial ties to the pharmaceutical industry.”
Let's look at one of those investigations that ICAN referred to. This investigation was completed on June 15, 2000 by the Committee on Government Reform. This committee prepared a document titled Conflicts of Interest in Vaccine Policy Making. The introduction begins by saying:
In August 1999, the Committee on Government Reform initiated an investigation into Federal vaccine policy. Over the last six months, this investigation has focused on possible conflicts of interest on the part of Federal policy-makers. Committee staff has conducted an extensive review of financial disclosure forms and related documents, and interviewed key officials from the Department of Health and Human Services, including the Food and Drug Administration and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
The report goes on to state (underline emphasis mine):
To provide focus to the discussion, this report examines the deliberations of the two committees on one specific vaccine -- the Rotavirus vaccine. Approved for use by the FDA on August 31, 1998, the Rotavirus vaccine was pulled from the market 13 months later after serious adverse reactions to the vaccine emerged. Financial disclosure forms and waivers granted to committee members who participated in these meetings were analyzed, along with their votes and actions taken during the meetings.
...Vaccines and Related Biological Products Advisory Committee [VRBPAC]
...In short, the VRBPAC advises the FDA on whether or not to license new vaccines for commercial use.
...The Government Reform Committee's investigation of the VRBPAC's Rotashield vaccine approval meeting raised several concerns:
Unanimous vote despite concerns raised: At the VRBPAC meeting, several members raised concerns about adverse effects that occurred at the rotavirus clinical trials. These included: intussusception, infant's failure to thrive, and febrile reactions among others.
A statement by Dr. Fleming, a temporary voting member, summarizes the statements of many of the other voting members. He stated: "And as a result, I would ask the FDA to work with the sponsor to further quantitate what these serious side effects are -- specifically the adverse effects, driven in particular by febrile illness -- is inducing hospitalizations and what is that level of access. I still don't feel like I have a good grasp of that at this point." He proceeded to vote for the approval recommendation.
Potential conflicts of interest of VRBPAC members: Four out of five members had conflicts of interest that necessitated waivers. Perhaps one of the major problems contributing to the overall influence of the pharmaceutical industry over the vaccine approval and recommendation process may be the loose standards that are used by the [FDA] in determining whether a conflict actually exists. (Exhibit 53). In many cases, significant conflicts of interest are not deemed to be conflicts at all...
As previously discussed, the statutory requirement of balanced representation is one of the most controversial provisions of the FACA [Federal Advisory Committee Act]. The FDA has interpreted "balance" as diversity of geography, ethnicity, disciplines and gender. While it is questionable whether this standard guarantees the balance of points of view represented expressly required by the statute, it was interesting to see the high concentration of professors in pediatrics represented on the VRBPAC committee, particularly during the Rotashield discussion...The overwhelming majority of members, both voting members and consultants, have substantial ties to the pharmaceutical industry.
Timing of the proceedings:
A particularly troubling aspect of the deliberations on the Rotashield vaccine is the sequence of events. The ACIP Committee voted to recommend universal vaccinations of infants before the FDA licensure of the vaccine. Officials of the CDC acknowledge that they knew of no other instance where this has happened. As discussed before, during the December 12, 1997, VRBPAC vote to recommend the licensure of the Rotashield vaccine, a number of concerns were raised by some of the members with regard to the vaccine and its possible adverse effects. Although the VRBPAC unanimously approved the vaccine recommendation, some of the committee members votes were conditioned on the FDA's ability to successfully resolve the areas of concern. However, before the FDA final licensure of the Rotashield vaccine in August 1998, the ACIP committee - as will be discussed in the ACIP section of this report- had already voted to recommend the mandatory universal use of the vaccine. This is troubling, not only because the vaccine had not yet been approved by the FDA, but because there were several areas of concerns that may not have been successfully addressed by the FDA, at the time of the ACIP vote.
That investigation repeatedly mentioned the conflicts of interest held by many voting committee members within VRBPAC and ACIP. The problems identified within that investigation have not been corrected. Although this investigation was completed in 2000, the problems identified have not been resolved to date. In addition to that issue, Science Magazine explains a newly identified phenomenon called, "pay-later" conflicts of interest, where FDA advisors are financially rewarded by pharmaceutical companies, after voting to approve a drug. The summary of this investigation states:
An investigative report uncovers little recognized and unpoliced potential conflicts of interest among those who serve on FDA advisory panels that review drugs. Some members of such panels are later receiving significant payments from either the makers of drugs they previously reviewed, or from competitors. This is happening despite the FDA's established system to identify possible financial conflicts of interest among those recruited for the drug advisory panels. The investigation analyzed records on the federal Open Payments website between 2013 and 2016. Of 107 physician advisors who voted on FDA advisory committees during this time, 26 later took more than $100,000 from the makers of drugs, or from competing firms, in post-hoc earnings or research support.
And an article written about this investigation, also published in Science Magazine, looked at the committee members' voluntary disclosure documents. The voluntary disclosure required members to explain any conflicts of interest that they had. The FDA was supposed to use those documents to determine whether or not it was appropriate to appoint an applicant to be an advisory committee. The article explains:
Science found that AstraZeneca and makers of rival drugs made payments to, or funded research by, several FDA advisers—including [Duke University cardiologist Christopher] Granger—in the year leading up to the 2009 meetings on [the drug] Seroquel. Granger calls full financial disclosure "crucially important" in order for FDA to assemble the best committee. "I certainly hope that I disclosed everything," he says. "If I hadn't, I would be horrified because that's antithetical to everything I believe in." After initially offering to share his disclosure forms, Granger did not respond to repeated requests for copies. In response to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, FDA says it could not locate his documents.
[Cardiologist Jonathan] Halperin [of the Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai in New York] has a similar history. In addition to receiving funds from AstraZeneca and its competitors after he voted to approve the anticlotting drug Brilinta, Halperin was receiving unspecified payments or research support from rival firms during the 12 months before the meeting. He says he disclosed the payments to FDA and that it did not flag them as conflicts. Science requested copies of his disclosure materials, but Halperin did not provide them. Again, FDA says it could not locate Halperin's disclosures.
...Rheumatologist Daniel Solomon of Harvard Medical School in Boston chaired the Amjevita panel. Neither FDA nor Solomon disclosed publicly that about 3 months before that meeting, Amgen provided $232,000 for his study of etanercept (Enbrel), another arthritis drug made by Amgen, and 1 month before the meeting AbbVie provided $819,000 for a Solomon study of Humira.
..Solomon says he described the payments in an FDA disclosure, but he hadn't kept a copy. The agency rejected a FOIA request for the document, calling its release "a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."
To summarize the problems explained to date, about government vaccine policy and regulation:
The pharmaceutical industry spends more money than any other industry, to lobby our politicians. If lobbying DIDN'T result in the passage of legislation favourable to the pharmaceutical industry, they wouldn't do it. Obviously, based on the money that continues to be spent on lobbying, it works very very favourably for industry. (Article that explains this in more detail Here)
Despite the government calling its involvement in health, "public health care," the government and medical institutions have never actually studied health, to learn what health is, who is healthy, and how health can be achieved in those that are unwell. Therefore, the name "public health" is an inaccurate reflection of what both government and medicine do. Based on the government's strategies, actions, measurements, tools, and targeted goals, a more appropriate name would be "public disease management." (Explained Here)
The money that flows from the pharmaceutical industry to government, through taxes, application fees and lobbying, ensures that "public disease management" is the medical model practiced day in day out, with no intention of moving into a model of health creation. Vaccines don't create health, they are used as a disease management tool. (Explained Here)
Decades ago, HHS, the department which oversees everything public health related, made one of their targeted goals maximum vaccine uptake. Achieving that target and maintaining it has taken priority over everything else about vaccines. Monitoring and improving the safety of the vaccines has been completely forgotten about by HHS. (Explained Here)
HHS has instructed that vaccine propaganda and censorship must be implemented, so that the public believes that vaccines do only good things. Obviously one reason for instructing this was to ensure vaccine uptake is maximized. Also, because HHS is the defendant in vaccine court, they (and their subordinate agencies) cannot say or publish research which shows that vaccines cause harm. Doing so would cause them to lose vaccine court cases and as a result they would have to pay out damages accordingly. (Explained Here and Here)
HHS oversees and determines the structural design of the FDA's operation. The FDA determines which drugs to license for public use. David Graham, the FDA whistleblower has explained that FDA's structure is biased favouring industry interests over public interests. (Explained Here)
David Graham explains that the FDA does a good job of ensuring that a drug will do what the maker says it does (for vaccines, this means the vaccine will produce an antibody response in most people). But Graham explains that the FDA does a very poor job of ensuring a drug is safe. He explains that the safety testing requirements are set up in reverse, with the drug maker having to prove a drug causes harm, instead of requiring the drug maker to prove the drug is safe. If the drug maker "can't" find a harm, because they purposefully didn't test the drug properly to be able to find a harm(s), then the drug declared to be safe. Purposefully not designing the tests properly, to discover harms, is legal - their willful ignorance is actually legally allowed. (Explained Here and Here)
The Prescription Drug User Fee Act exaggerated the FDA's bias favouring industry over public safety. This Act created a culture within the FDA, where a drug review is required to be quick and a drug's approval is expected, because the pharmaceutical company paid their fee. FDA has been directed to NOT stand in the way of industry profit making. (Explained Here)
The FDA's Vaccines and Related Biological Products Advisory Committee (VRBPAC), advises FDA on whether or not to license new vaccines for commercial use. The VRBPAC committee members often have significant ties to pharmaceutical industry. One investigation into these conflicts of interest found that the FDA used "loose standards." These loose standards allow FDA to appoint committee members whose conflicts of interest are "significant."
The pharmaceutical industry is essentially paying off federal regulators to approve their drugs, either through FDA drug application fees, research grants or pay later conflicts of interest. Those payments which are currently legal, create bias favouring industry and that money has been shown to significantly influence decision making. Graham explained that FDA officials are pressured by their superiors to approve drugs quickly. And the Committee on Government reform investigation explained that VRBPAC committee members are often heavily affiliated with pharmaceutical companies. This investigation showed that despite committee members expressing concerns about drug side effects, they still vote unanimously to approve them.
And if you think Health Canada does a better job than the American HHS or FDA, at being more thorough, transparent or unbiased when monitoring drugs and vaccines, or regulating those products, think again. In Canada, we have repeatedly followed in the footsteps of the FDA, and in addition to that, we have also implemented legislation that creates a veil of secrecy to protect industry from the public. You read that correct. Though it is assumed that Health Canada is supposed to protect the public from industry, legislation is actually written in reverse, such that industry is protected from the public.
Canadian research from 2004 states:
In Canada, the information used to approve new drugs is deemed commercially sensitive and hence confidential under the Access to Information Act, and the Therapeutic Products Directorate (TPD) will not release such information without the manufacturer's approval. As a consequence, safety and efficacy information contained in unpublished trials submitted to the TPD is generally unavailable to researchers, physicians and patients, a situation that can potentially lead to the inappropriate prescribing and use of medications.
The standard argument for the legal protection of these data is that their disclosure would compromise the economic interests of drug manufacturers. This rationale is difficult to credit in view of experience in other jurisdictions. The US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) discloses research information from preclinical and clinical trials that is considered proprietary in Canada, without apparent negative effects on companies' profitability or willingness to operate in the US market.
On the other hand, nondisclosure has serious disadvantages for the TPD, health professionals and the Canadian public. If scientific data submitted to regulatory agencies are never disclosed or allowed to enter normal peer-review channels, neither these data nor TPD reviewers' evaluations can become subject to scrutiny by independent scientists...
...A model for the minimum level of reporting already exists in FDA approval packages. Once a drug has been approved in the United States, the FDA posts on its Website a detailed summary of the information that the company has submitted, including the clinical trial data. Compared with what is already available in the US, this initiative for greater transparency in Canada is grossly inadequate.
And in a more recent evaluation of Canadian drug regulation, an article from 2016 explained that during the 20th century, Canada relied heavily upon input from the pharmaceutical industry, and followed in the footsteps of the US, when defining our own drug regulation practices. The paper stated:
...industry’s influence over regulatory decision making increased throughout the 20th century. Once the Department of Health was formed, industry became directly involved in drafting regulations and developing guidelines and other materials. The regulator assumed a cooperative approach with industry on the theory that this was the more effective means of regulation, reinforced through a revolving door of employees between industry and the regulator...[A]s early as the 1940s, Canadian regulatory officials began interacting with their American counterparts, embracing the norms of confidentiality that dictated American regulatory practice.
That paper also had the following to say:
How do you change the way an institution has worked for nearly a century? This is the challenge that the biomedical community must help Health Canada confront if the regulation of pharmaceutical drugs is to substantially improve. Transparency was once characteristic of Canadian pharmaceutical regulation. Recent changes in law may mark a return to openness, but if history is instructive, physicians and biomedical researchers will need to push the regulator for change.
The regulation of pharmaceutical drugs was once a remarkably public exercise. Starting in 1887, the Canadian regulator (originally the Department of Inland Revenue) began publishing bulletins. Often hundreds of pages, the bulletins named names, identifying “drug houses” and “shopkeeps” that produced adulterated goods...
When the new federal Department of Health took over and Canada’s inaugural Food and Drugs Act was passed in 1920, regulation went dark....When the department began collecting evidence about drug safety in the 1940s and ’50s (including drug effectiveness in the later decade), it treated that information as company property, not to be shared. Fastforward to the present and it’s clear that this institutionalized practice of secrecy has not served the public well: physicians have been misinformed and patients have been unnecessarily harmed. For example, tens of thousands of people are estimated to have died from cardiac arrest after being prescribed the arthritis medication rofecoxib (Vioxx) — a risk that regulatory officials had previous knowledge of but nevertheless kept confidential.
What Canadian's need to realize is that Canadian regulation practices are very similar to American practices, which is obvious recognizing that both countries have approved the same dangerous drugs, like Vioxx, that later needed to be recalled. Another similarity between the two countries, is that Canada uses many of the same vaccine brands that are used in the US, and Canada follows a very similar vaccine schedule despite several other 1st world nations following a significantly lesser vaccination schedule. A key difference between Canada and the US, is that unlike in the US, Canada doesn't have a compensation program to provide financial assistance following a vaccine injury, and we also don't have a Federal Agency that is officially tasked with conducting biennial vaccine safety audits on all childhood vaccines, to identify ways vaccines are unsafe, and to continually improve the safety of those vaccines. For vaccine safety in Canada, we rely solely on the pre-licensing testing completed by the vaccine manufacturers themselves, testing which only monitors vaccine recipients for a few hours or days following receipt of a vaccine. Furthermore, Health Canada maintains that that pre-licensing data must be kept confidential to protect the manufacturer. Once a vaccine is being used widely on Canadians, we then rely upon doctors to identify and report adverse reactions. Unfortunately, it is common knowledge that the vast majority of medical professionals throughout the world, fail to file the appropriate adverse event reports that they are required to file, reports that would help track and monitor vaccine safety.
In 2000, a young Canadian by the name of Vanessa Young died suddenly from an adverse effect of a medication that she had been prescribed, an adverse affect that Health Canada was aware about but did little to inform doctors about. For the next 14 years, her father, Canadian MP Terence Young, worked tirelessly to bring about reform within Canadian drug regulation, and his relentless effort finally paid off in 2014. As a result of his effort, Health Canada passed a new Bill, called Vanessa's Law. Vanessa's Law is a step in the right direction. It gives Health Canada powers it didn't have before. Health Canada now has the authority to withdraw a dangerous drug from the market. What's incredible about that is Health Canada didn't have this power before. And now Health Canada can release confidential information about the pre-licensing testing. Vanessa's Law also gives Health Canada the ability to impose heavy penalties, daily, against parties that contravene the legislation, and the legislation has the potential to improve the reporting of adverse drug and vaccine reactions. Though this legislation is a step in the right direction, it is likely that for the time being, many measures within Vanessa's Law will not be implemented fully or change the current secretive culture within Health Canada.
For Vanessa's Law to have a real impact, doctors need to first be educated and supported, so that they are able to follow through rigorously on the policy's mandates. Currently, a doctor's understanding of what constitutes an adverse drug or vaccine reaction is inadequate. And the current adverse event reporting processes are inefficient, time consuming, and misaligned with how work-flow operates within medical care. As a consequence, doctors and nurses continue to fail to file these reports.
As for the current culture of secrecy within Health Canada, the way Vanessa's Law is written, the law states that Health Canada has the discretion to release confidential information. That means that the data held by Health Canada will remain confidential. At present, information that is currently made public for Americans by their FDA, that same information will remain hidden from Canadians, and the information will only be shared with Canadians if the health minister "believes" the therapeutic product "may" cause harm to the public. A July 2018 article shows that Health Canada is still trying to prevent public access to such data. In spite of Vanessa's Law, Health Canada refused to release the information and the inquiring researcher had to file a lawsuit in Canadian Federal Court against Health Canada. The Federal Court judge deemed Health Canada's actions unreasonable, and the final ruling required Health Canada to release the documents to the researcher. Health Canada's backwards approach, its motivation to protect pharmaceutical interests over public interests matches David Graham's accusation of the FDA, that the FDA views industry as their client not the public or public health. As a result, Canadian drug regulation is as bad, or worse, compared to HHS and FDA practices.
Continue to the next post in this series: Here
HHS Instruction: well-founded vaccine safety concerns cannot be allowed to exist Here
HHS: Instruction to media to censor vaccine critical discussions Here
ICAN letter addressed to the Secretary of HHS Here
Investigation into FDA VRBPAC committee conflicts of interest Here
Investigative Report (Science Magazine) - pay-later conflicts of interest Here
Science Magazine article about pay-later conflicts of interest Here
Health Canada protects industry from the public Here
Health Canada has had a culture of secrecy for 100 years Here
Worldwide it is recognized that only a fraction of adverse events are reported Here
Media coverage of Vanessa's Law - current adverse event reporting is for only a fraction of the events that occur Here
Federal Court Judge orders Health Canada to release documents Here
Vanessa's Law - an amendment to Health Canada's Food and Drugs Act Here
You can re-fresh your memory on all the things David Graham said about the flawed FDA regulations from his 2005 interview Here
You are currently on Part 2 of a 14 Part Series.
View a Post in the Series Using the Links Below:
Part 1 of 14: Consumer Safety Nets Here
Part 2 of 14: HHS Here
Part 3 of 14 : (You are on this page)
Part 4 of 14: The CDC Here
Part 5 of 14: The DHHS & IOM Here
Part 6 of 14: Scientific Research Here
Part 7 of 14: Scientific Research Corruption Here
Part 8 of 14: The Medical Journals Here
Part 9 of 14: Our Doctors Here
Part 10 of 14: Doctors Responsibility Here
Part 11 of 14: Medical Institutions Here
Part 12 of 14: VAERS Here
Part 13 of 14: The Media Here
Part 14 of 14: The Legal System Here